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Intr odu ctio n
The purp ose of this repo rt is (a) to anal yze
the inte ract ion
of inte rnat iona l fact or t:lOVements prim arily
of labo r, with t:he
stru ctur e of prod uctio n and trad e and (b)
to stud y the corr espo ndin g
imp lica tion s for poli cy. Going over the rele
vant lite ratu re one is
surp rise d to find bow li_mited it actu ally
is, _des pite many theQ retic al.
and emp irica l stud ies on the dete rmin ants of
trad e or the dete rmin ants
of inte rreg iona l and (les s so) inte rnat iona
l fact or movements. 1 This
can be part ially attri bute d to a grow ing inte
rest and emp hasis on
mon etary rath er than real -sid e phenomena but
also to a prev alen t
perc epti on that most of the theo retic al ques
tion s have alre ady been
sett led. While this repo rt does not attem
pt to pres ent a con siste nt,
fully -wor ked out framework for anal yzin g the
inte ract ion of trad e and
fact or mob ility , it will hope fully shed ligh
t on some of the inte rest ing
ques tion s that rema in unanswered and prov ide
some insi ght into the
inter depe nden ce of poli cies .
Sect ion 1 of the repo rt focu ses on the exis
ting degr ee of
"sub stitu tabi lity " betw een trad e and inte rnat
iona l fact or movements.
The cent ral ques tion s that are pose d here
are the follo wing : (a)
why do fact or movements take plac e in
a worl d char acte rize d by
commodity trad e; (b) what are the imp lica tion
s of eith er trad e or
fact or movements for inte rcou ntry diff eren ces
in fact or pric es, and
fina lly, (c) what are the prob able effe cts
of fact or 1110vementa on the
wlum e of trad e.
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Section 2 analyzes these implicati ons in a dynamic framework
and discu.sses the likely impact of U.S. immigrati on on the U.S. trade
balance.

Finally Section 3 focuses on the substitut ability of policies

aimed at restrictin g the free flow of commodit ies or
lbe main objective

factor■•

of brealc.ing up the analysis into these

three parts is to describe the principal components of a continuou s
process of dynamic adjustmen t where differenc es in economic structure s
and policies across countries both determine and are determine d by
trade flows and factor movements.

lbis process continues until that

time when cross-cou ntry commodity and factor prices move closely
enough together so that there are no more advantage s to be gained

from trading commodit ies or relocatin g factora.
lbe emphasis of this report is placed on labor rather than capital
movements; yet it is important to realize that the effects of labor
aigration on the structure of productio n and trade crucially depend
on what happens to capital movements.

Similarly , while the analysis

is cast in terms of the receiving country, the effects of factor 1110ve
ments on the country of origin can have important implicati ons for the
terms and volume of trade, especiall y if the country is not "small"

in vorld aarketa.
Despite these and other shortcomi ngs, the analysis in thi•
report pointa to a number of interesti ng conclusio ns:
1)

Both real vage

differential ■

and employment opportun ities aeem

to be important determina nts of labor mobility vith the latter being

probably the dominant factor.
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2)

The simultaneous occurrence of trade and factor mobility can thus

ba explained both within and outside the framework of the "factor

price equalization" (FPE) theorem.

Not .only will relaxation of any

one of its assumptions give rise to cross-country real-wage differentials
in the presence of trade, but differences in employment opportunities
and/or other economic characteristics will give rise to differences in
the present discounted value of the net benefits that are expected to
be derived in each location, and hence will induce migration.

3)

The degree of substitutabilit y of trade and factor mobility

crucially depends on cross-co\llltry similarities in production ·
and consumption.

4)

Given the United State's trade structure, where exports are

primarily human-capital intensive while imports are unskilled-labo r
intensive (Kenen, 1965; Branson and Monoyios, 1977), large inflows
of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor will have an anti

trade bias and cause an improvement in the terms of trade unless
capital roves in an offsetting manner or overall consumption
shifts towards importables.
Finally,

5)

T~ade policy and regulation of factor movements are interdependent

and cannot be exercised independently of each other especially in

the context of a country such as the U.S. which is open to both
coamodity and factor flows.

The effectiveness of trade policy will

depend on the degree of international factor mobility while the success
of i1111tigration policies will depend on both capital movements and
ci-ade patterns.
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tor Movements
"Su bst itut abi lity " of Trade and Fac
sta tes tha t the funda.mental
The theo ry of com para tive adv anta ge
es 1• diff ere nce s in rel ativ e col ts
det erm ina nt of trad e between cou ntri
by now wid ely acc epte d and em piri 
of pro duc tion . Thi s pro pos itio n is
sten ce of pre fer ent ial tra ~
cal ly val ida ted reg ard less of the exi
ral trad e cle arin gs in which cas es
agr eem ents , custom unio ns or bil ate
It sta tes tha t a cou ntry vil l exp ort
e.
inat
dom
may
ia
ter
cri
ic
nom
-eco
non
have a rela tive pri ce (re lati vel y
tho se goods which in auta rch y vou ld
erai re) low er tha n its pot ent ial
tha t is, to an arb itra rily cho sen num
imp ort tho se goods which in
trad ing par tne rs and cor resp ond ing ly
hig her than its pot ent ial
aut arc hy would have a rela tive pri ce
trad e is thu s ind epe nde nt of the
trad ing par tne ra •. The dire ctio n of
the ser.se tha t vha t ma tter s is
sou rce s of com par ativ e adv anta ge in
cou ntri es and not the und erly ing
the rat io of rela tive pric es between
s the re exi st a number of exp lan a
rea son s for the se diff ere nce s. Thu
ntri es and as a con seq uen ce a
tion s of trad e pat tern s between cou
parative adv anta ge has bee n attr ibu ted
number of the ore tica l t10dels. Com
ty or the exi stin g tech nol ogy of
to diff ere nce s in fac tor s' pro duc tivi

1.

9) to diff ere nce s in tas tes
pro duc tion (Ri card o, 1911; Jon es, 197
endowments (Re cks che r, 194 9;
(Ro bins on, 1947) and rel ativ e fac tor
ce of economies of sca le in
Ohl in, 1933) or fin ally to the pre sen
pro duc tion (Krugman, 197 8).
epe nde nt of the eou rce • of
While the dire ctio n of trad e 1• ind
trad e on dom esti c pro duc tion
coa par ativ e adv anta g~ the eff ect • of

oot . If the aai n aou rce of compara
and on rela tive fac tor pri ce• 1•
enc e, in lab or pro duc tivi ty (ill a
tive adv anta ge for example 1a dif fer

s
one factor

two-goods world) free trade will probably lead to complete

apecialization in production 2 while the ratio of relative real wages

in the two countries (defined in terms of the home good) will equal

the

ratio of the fixed output-labor coefficients.

Thus if the main

explanation for trade between countries is existing differences in in
variant output--labor coefficients, one would not expect factor prices
to be equalized through trade.

If, however, the principal reason

that trade takes place is differences in relative factor endowments,

then in this simple two-factor, two-commodities, two-country ~-orld
and under a series of restrictive assumptions, which are listed

below, free trade will lead to factor-price equalization not only in
relative but also in absolute terms.

Within a Heckscher-Ohlin framework,

trade will lead a country to e~port that good that uses intensively its

physically abundant (and hence low-price) factor;
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the production of

that good will consequently increase and the return of the factor
which is used intensively in its production will rise relatively to
the return of the other factor.

Thus relative factor prices will

tend to become equalized across countries provided that there is
perfect competition in commodity and factor l!larkets, that the factors
of production are perfectly mobile within each country, that production
functions are identical and the factor intensity of each industry is
invariant to scale or relative factor returns; if in addition to
these assumptions, there are no tariffs or other impediments to
trade and no complete specialization in production then relative
factor prices will be

equalized.

If now pr~duction functions are also

characterized by constant returns to scale.then there will be
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equalizatio n of absolute factor returns as well.

tbia 1• the uaence

of the absolute FPE (AFPE) theorem expounded by Samuelson in a aeries
of articles on trade and (actor prices. (Stolper and Samuelaon, 1941;
Samuelson, 1949).
\lhether or not therefore trade equalizes absolute factor returns
depends on a aet of restrictive assumptions about the atructure of pro
duction and markets.

\lhat is now the relationshi p between trade and

internation al factor movements and in what sense are comrm:>dity and factor
flows "perfect substitutes ''?

On

the one hand, they are both assumed to

.

depend on cross-count ry differences in relative prices; on the other
hand either trade or factor movements is expected to have the same in
fluence on cross-count ry relative· prices. -Each of these proposition s
can be challenged in a variety of vays in an effort to question the
operational if not theoretical validity of the "perfect substitutab ility"
characteriz ation while emphasizing the relevance of "partial aubstitut
ability" both for theory and policy-purp oses.

la.

Factor Movements in the Presence of Commodity Trade
Moat of the economic literature on lbigration

■ tresses

the

importance of "economic attractiven ess" of a place in the decision to
aigrate (Cebula, 1979i Greenwood, 1975).

Yet 1110st authors would

probably not accept without qualificatio ns Hick'• atatement that
"••• differences in net economic advantages. chiefly differences in

vages, are the aain cause• of

■igration ...."

(1932, p. 76; italic• added).

The eapirical literature on interregion al migration has ahovn that a
awaber of other variable• beeidee vage1 (nold.nal or real) determine
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the direction of migration.

Among non-economic •ariables one finds that

quality of life consideration• which include both natural or ■ocial
characteristics are important determinants of human aigration (Cebula,
1979, p. 27).

Among economic variables, a long list of costs and

benefits which are associated with specific locations have been shown
to be statistically significant.

These include government services,

tax structures, expected growth of income, transfer payments etc.
(Cebula, 1979, p. 74; Field ■, 1979~ Greenwood· 1975). Two; ·additional
elements of the migration decision make it qualitatively different
from trade:

the introduction of time and uncertainty.

In recent

years, it has become increasingly common to analyze the migration
decision as an investment decision.
and G.

s.

Following T.

W.

Schult~ (1961)

Becker (1962) a nUlllber of studies that adopt this framework

argue that geographic migration is generated only when there is a
positive present discounted value of the expected real net benefits
from mobility {Sjaastad, 1962; Cebula 1979).

Thus even if there

exists a factor-price differential between two areas, factors might
not be willing to move unless the differential is sufficiently large
to make the total discounted value of future net benefits positive.

Alternatively even if present real rates of return are equalized, pennan
ent migration might still take place if there are substantial differences
in the expected future streaa of benefita. 4
In addition to the time element, interregional. migration is
also affected by uncertainty about employment opportunities.

In a

ae~e• of articles written in the context of developing countries a
number of authors (Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Stiglitz, 1974)
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have underline d the importanc e not of the actual but of the expected
income (or real-wage ) different ial between regions which incorpora tes
the probabili ty of being employed into the migration decision.

loth

the actual level of unemplo)'1Ilent and the probabili ty of being selected
from the pool of Wlemployed become important explanato ry variables of
l!igration .

It is interestin g to note that in the context of several

empirical studies, the unemployment variable has been found to be
either statistic ally insignifi cant or supposedl y of the wrong aign
(i.e. positive) in explainin g migration flows.

This result should

not be surprisin g within the context of a Harris-To daro mode~ aince
111igrants will trade off the probabili ty of remaining unemployed with
the probabili ty of getting a

higher-pa ying jobs. It has actually

been shown (Hall 1970, 1972) that at least within the U.S., there
is a positive correlatio n across cities between real wages and

unemployment rates.

In that case, the expected sign of unemployment

in a migration equation with only unemployment as the independe nt
variable should be ambiguous.
Most of the recent theoretic al and empirical literatur e on
aigration focuses on interregi onal rather than internatio nal labor
flows with the exception of a aeries of studies on the brain drain
and the welfare implicatio ns of labor mobility (Bhagwati , ed. 1976;
Bhagva~i and ltamaswami, 1977) •• well as a limited number
of empirical studies that focus on time-seri es data (for a review
aee Thomas, 1973, also Kagnussen_and Sigvelan~ , 1978).

One would

oot expect, however, that the fundamen tal determina nts of aigration ,

umely expected .real incone differen tials, differenc e• in the preaent
· dbcounte d value of other net benefits and locationa l character iatica:..
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that might affect the quality of life, would be substantially dif
ferent aCToss
across regions.

countries in their effect on migration than they are
There is still need for empirical work on an inter-

national scale to determine (a) the differential effects of "push"
and "pull" factors (b) the potential separability of the decision
to emigrate from the choice of final destination point, (c) the
proper specification of the equations to be estimated and (d)
problems in estimation due to the possible synchronization of
international economic activity.

A preliminary ·investigation into

the determinants of Greek and Italian migration to the United States
seems to yield encouraging results.

Table 1 gives an aggregate

picture of migration flows across countries for the period 19601975.

It reports the flows of migrants into each of three

aajor destinations points for a number of countries that are listed

on the top of the table.

Immigration from these selected countries

accounted on average for 36 .8 percent of total immigration into the
United States for the pe~iod 1971-1975.

As it can be readily seen

from the above table the choice of final destination varies both
across countries and across time.

Thus while only 3.6 percent of the

total average annual flow of Greek emigrants came to the United
States in the period 1960-1965, that percentage rose to 17.9 percent

by 1971-1975.

Similarly, for Japan the average annual flow of emigrants

to the United States rose from 33.5 percent of total Japanese emigr~tion
in 1960-1965 to 56.9 percent in the period 1971-1975.

Focusing on Greek and Italian immigration into the U.S., the
first hypothesis that was tested was that the choice of final deatina

t1on, measured by gross migration to a given country as a percentage of
ec>tal emigration from either Greece or Italy, depended on relative
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See data are for period 1971-1974 only

3 -Point of departure data.
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·For period 1971-1973 only

S For 1966-1969 only
':1967, 1970 data missing
Sources:

Compiled from Table 29, "Long-Term Emi~rants and Immi~rants by
country or area of last or intended long-term residence 1958-1976" in the
United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1977.
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real wages and employment rates in each of the three aain alternati-..e
destination points.
The theoretical nodel that underlines this spe~ification 1a
•imilar to that of Armington'• (1969) in the trade literature, where it
1a assumed that the direction of trade is invariant to the overall

YDlume of trade.

In extending this model to migration flows, this

vould imply that the ~ecision to emigrate is independent of the
choice of final destination.
The following logarithmic equation was thus estimated for

the period 1960-1976 on Greek and Italian emigration data:
E
• A+ (I Clj 1n vj)
{.=!j_)
tn
t
E
j
t-k
1

+ (ISj

.

,.~'

1n

c!>)

+ ut'

(1)

L j t-k
k • O, 1

I

where,
Eij • gross migration from country i to country j,where i •
Creece or Italy and j • United States, Germany, Australia
or
1

1

vj

Svi uerland

• total emigration from country i

• index of hourly earnings or total hourly compensation 1n

each country j deflated by the country'• CPI and expressed
in country i'• home-currency units

'

H
(L)j • civilian employment in country j as a percentage of that
country'• labor force.

The aull hypothesis that

va ■

tested vu that the relative

flov of illlldgrant• into each country is positively correlated vith
that country'• real vage level and employment opportunitiea.

The
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results which are presented in Appendix 1 did not turn out to be satis
factory mainly due to two factors:

(a) great variability of total emigra

tion flows from each of the two countries vhich could not be explained
by the independent variables chosen and (b) the presence of collinearity
between the independent variables.

Thus most coefficients turned to be

insignificant if not of the wrong sign, even though the overall explana
tory power of the regression turned out in most cases to be relatively
high.

In addition, the correlation coefficients between the independent
variables also reported in Appendix 1 seem to suggest (a) that Hall's
observation about the positive correlation between real wage and un.employ
aent rates across U.S. cities seem to hold equally well across countries
and (b) that there is sufficient synchronization of economic activity
at least across the major industrialized countries to make the choice
of final destination point dependent on a number of other factors besides
expected income differentials.

In that case, distance, transportation

costs, information flows and other locational characteristics would
tend to be the discriminating factors.

On the basis of the above

evidence it seem.s reasonable to suggest that there is no clear
aeparability of the decision to emigrate from the choice of final destin
ation; instead an individual's decision to relocate seems to depend
on both origin and destination conditions.
This is also the hypothesis put forvard by Fields (1979) who
uses it to analyse migration flows between regions.

The underlying

aodel behind Fiel~ specification is a polytomous logistic model
developed by McFadden (1974) and applied to aigration initially by
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Schultz (1977), were migration ,.ii taken to be a linear function in the
logarithms of the origin and destination conditions aa vell •• of the
distance betveen the tvo regions.

The application of this •~lyaia

to Cr~ek and Italian emigration into the United States, Germany,
Australia, and/or Switierland would suggest that gross e1nigration
from each of these two places would be positively related to real
vage and employment levels in each of the various countries of destination
and negatively- related to real wage and employment opportuniti es in
the country of origin.

The following equation was thus estimated for

the period 1960-1~76 under various lag distributio ns:

The null hypothesis is that coefficient s a , and 8
1
1
are positive, vhile coefficient s a and s are negative.
2
2
Immigration data come from the Annual Reports of the Immigration
and Naturalizat ion Service and the U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1977; the
real wage series was computed by deflating hourly earnings by the relevant
CPI's and converting the series into home currency units via application
of the appropriate bilateral exchange rate.

The main sources of data

for this series were the OECD's Main Econ01:1ic Indicators and-the IMF'a,
Internation al Financial Statistics. . OECD'•
Main £conomic Indicators ie
.
also the principal source for the employment series which

-

to employment in manufacturi ng.
estimated

coefficient ■

refer ■

only

Table 2 reports the Talue• of the

from equation 2.

All the atatistical ly atgni

ficaat oaes(t-ratio a are reported tn.pareathe aea) have the expected
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Table 2.

Gro•s Migration
!"'rc,m:

A.

SSE

-A

Greece
to

9.669
{1.137)

9.325
{2.369)

0.553
{0.545)

6.427*
(4 .833)

-4.196*
{3.172)

.908

.359

Germany

~15.S03
.( 0.3-.1)

2.891
(0.708)

0.255
(0.169)

6.845
(2.179)

-7.545*
(1.783)

.868

.457

·Australia

-64.399·
( 1.254)

· -0.171
{0.083)

-3.316
{1.583)

12.214*2

-6. 713* · ·
(2. 707)

• 794-

.230 -

(l.870)

Italy
to
30.855
United States { 1.134)

8.549
(2.644)

-1.494
{1.599)

1.826*
(1.318)

-3.135*
(1.019)

.710

.532

Gensany

-31.614
( 1.650)

1.872
(1.237)

. -1.686
(1.615)

8..195
(6.137)

-3.534
(-1.843)

.. 889

.269

Switzerland

-15.999
{ 2.047)

-4.100
{3.456)

-0.734
{2.329)

-0.574
{0.892)

.991

.037

United States

B.

Elasticity Estimates of Gross Migration Flows to Origin
and Destination Conditions

Notes
1. An asterisk indicates a one year lag.
2. -Percent change in civilian employment

4.072*2
(5.181)
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sign with the aole exception of the

°i

coefficie nt in the case of

Italian-S wiss aigration which is aignifica ntly negative.

tbe follow

ing conclusio ns can be derived from the preli.Jrlna ry testa.

a.

In both the Creek and the Italian case, the~real vage proves to be

• aignifica ot detennina nt for emigratio n to the United States contrary
to the case for Germany.

The Italian-S wiss case is harder to explain

due to the negative sign of the coefficie nt.
b.

tbe real wage at the original location, tends to be insignifi cant

with the sole exception again of the -Italian-S wiss- ~ase. - ..
· c.

Employment rates in the countries of destinatio n are uniformly

significa nt with the exception this time of the Italian-U .S. case.
All coefficie nts have a positive sign as expected.
d.

Greater domestic employment oppo~tun ities seem to reduce the in

centives to migrate in both cases but t_he internal employment
rate is a statistic ally significa nt determina nt of emigratio n only
in the Greek case.
In general, one can conclude that "pull" factors seem to dominate
"push" factors and that both the real wage and employment opportun ities
affect significa ntly the decision to emigrate, as the applicati on of
the Harris-To daro model in an open economy •uggests.

Such findings

aupport Ohlin'• comment that labor'• "internat ional 1110bility 1• reduced
by all the ties that unite a citizen vith his native land and its
culture.

The inevitabl e uncertai nty•• to hie fortunes in a new

country also tends to keep him from emigratin g, especiall y if he ia
temperam entally disinclin ed to undertake risks" (Ohlin, 1933, p. 208).

1be7 alao question the theoretic al •alidity and usefulnea • of a atrict
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adherence to the "perfect substitutability" assumption between trade
and factor mobility:

cross-country absolute factor prices cannot

be equalized except under very restrictive assumptions about the
nature of trade and comparative advantage and even if they were,

a number of other economic variables, such

as

employment opportunities,

would still induce migration flows between ~ountries.

The proven

sensitivity however, of both trade and migration flows to factor price
differentials underlines the need for a joint consideration of trade
and- factor flows.

As -Ohlin -succinctly stated,. ~!a. theory of international

movements of factors of production can be built only in close contact
with the theory of international commodity movements".

(Ohlin 1977, p.

34).

1. b.

Trade and Factor Mobility:
As we

~t.u.>~titutability vs. Complementary

have seen in Section l,a above, trade in a Hecksher-Ohlin

world will tend to equalize relative commodity and factor prices and
thus reduce some of the incenthes for factor movements.

Similarly

factor movements will usually tend to make prices of factors and
commodities more uniform across countries and thus elimiaate some of
the advantages of trade.

For these reasons it is often argued that

trade tends to displace factor movements and that factor movements
tend to· displace trade.

Under the AFPE assumptions, trade and factor

mobility would become "perfect. substitutes"~

Alternatively, an increase
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in trade impediments would stimulate factor l!IOvernents and an increase
in restrictio~s t~ factor movements would stimulate trade.

The al?ove

proposition was proven rigorously by Mundell (1957) who showed that if
capital is in fact perfectly mobile between countries the imposition
even of a scall tar.iff would eliminate trade completely since the

movement of capital would equalize absolute factor returns; similarly,
a tax on capital would stimulate trade.

The partial or total displacemen t of one type of flow by _the
other due to the tendency of both trade and factor movements to equalize
relative prices have been challenged on various grounds.
On

free

a theoretical level Olivera (1967) has argued that even if

trade and factor mobility completely equalized prices th is wculJ

not necessarily mean that "they both equali_ze them at the same levels".
In contrastin~ trade in consumer go.., ds with labour rd.gration he shows

that factor prices would be eq~alized

at different levels throurh

trade than through labour migration if tastes change as a result of
migration.

Thus "perfect substitutio n" involves not only the same

"at1DOsphere for production" but also the same "atmosphere for consumption "
or that the countries are exact replicas of one another (Olivera
1967, p. 168).
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A number of other authors have challenged the assumed substitut

ability of trade and factor movements on account of differences in the
structure of production attributed either to the presence of third factors
or differences in technology.

Brinley Thomas has shown for example that

.throughout the 19tH century, migration of labour from England to the
United States was accompanied by increased trade between the two countries
due to the presence of relatively productive land in the United States,
i.e. a third ractor of production (Thomas, 1961).

---··---

Similarly Ohlin has argued that the substitutability of trade
by factor movements need not hold if "the quantity of certain productive

factors in a country may be so small that an increased supply does not
reduce but increases their prices" (Ohlin, 1933, 3rd ed., p. 215).
For example, the fresence of external economies as labor flows into a
scantily populated country might cause wages to increase rather than
be reduced as a result of migration.

More gensrally in the presence of

a third factor of production or for that matter external economies the
productivity of a factor might be raised because of and despite an
increase in its supply.
On

a more rigorous level Purvis (1972), has shown that once

technologies are assumed to differ between countries (a) free trade
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is not sufficient to establish world efficiency in production while
capital mobility is now a necessary condition for such efficiency,
and {b) that the introduction of capital sobility into a free trade

situation
On

may

serve to increase the volume of trade.

similar grounds Schmitz and Helmherger (1970) argue that

trade and international capital movements can be complements if
there are sufficient differences in the productivity of a gi'l'ell
factor across countries.

Referring particularly to trade in primary

com:nodities they,as well as Purvis, argue that the -volume of trade
may actually rise if, by allowing factor mobility, a product can be
come so much cheaper by being produced in a different country that
"its total use has been expanded", (Schmitz and Helmberger, 1970, p.
764).

It follows that the degree of substitutability between trade and
factor movements depends on the similarity of the production and con
sumption structures between the trading partners.

If trade and factor

mobility takes place between more or less similar countries then one
would expect them to be substitutes; in the case of trade and factor
mobility between dissimilar countries one would expect them to be
complements.

As we will see in Section

3, this has important implications

for policy since trade impedi~nts might increase or reduce factor
1DOvements or alternatively restrictions of factor mobility might increase
or reduce the volune of trade.
Before drawing policy conclusions on the basis of these considera
tions we should look at the main conclusions of the "growth and trade"_
literature regarding the effects of growth in factor supplies on the
terms and volume of trade.
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2.

Growth in Factor Supplies and Trade
There is by now an extensive literature on the effects

of growth on trade (Rybczynski, 1955; Findlay and Grubert 1959;
Johnson, 1958, 1962; for a good review see Heller, 1968).

There

are two sets of assumptions that play an important part in the out
come of the analysis:

(1) whether or not the cotmtry can affect its

terms of trade and (2) if economic growth is generated by changes
in factor endowments or in production ftmctions, i.e. technology.
Since the objective of this section is to study tt~ effects
of factor movements on a country like the U.S., the analysis will
be restricted to changes in factor endowments in a "large" cotmtry
setup.

It will also be assumed that the other countries are price

takers, i.e., "small" in commodity and factor markets so that factor
movements affect only their output composition.
Changes in the factor endowments of a country might result
in pro-trade or anti-trade biases in consumption and production with
different implications for the terms and volume of trade, depending
on how growth affects the production and consumption of the exportable
and importable commodities.

It is thus important to introduce a

"dynamic " element in the discussion of section 1 which assumed that
the national income in each cotmtry was about the same as it was
before the factor movements.

Alternatively, the expansion of output

and incomes due to increases in the domestic supply of labor and
~apital might lead to an increase in trade even if trade and factor

movements are considered substitutes in the short-nm. (Ohlin, 1933,
p. 215).
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Assuming that x is the exportable labor-intensive commodity and
1

x2

is the importable, capital-intensive coillilodity, an increase in the

overall capital-labor ratio of a country in the same proportion as the
capital-labor ratio in x will result in an increase in production of
1

x1

but will not affect production of

x2 •

Since

x1

is the exportable

commodity, the resulting bias in production, will be a "pro-traJe"

.

bias.

If the change in factors is such that production of x2 actually

decreases, then we talk about an "ultra pro-trade bias" in production.
This vill be the case for example if there is only an increas·e in
labor due to immigration with no corresponding movements in capital.
On

the consumption side, a pro-trade bias implies that the change ir,

overall fa.:ton would result in an increase of the marginal propensity

to import above the average.

Similarly an "ultra pro-trade bias"

in consumption implies a greater than unity marginal propensity to

import.

This will be the case for example if there is a shift in

consumption tm,,ards importables as a result of immigration due to
strong preferen=~ f~r t~e home good on the part of the-imroi~rants.
The coc::bination of trade biases in production and con~ULt~:ion
due to changes in factor endowments affect both the volume and
the terms of trade of a large country.

Table 3 S\Blm\arizes the main

conclusions of the gro~th and trade literature as to production and
the terms of trade.

A

"+"

indicates an improvement and a "-" indicates

a worsening of the terms of trade.

A question mark indicates that

the movement of the terms of trade is ambiguous.
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Table 3:
Growth and Trade

Growth Bias in Consumption
Grouth
Bias in
Production

Production
Effects

Ultra AntiTrade

!1Xz

AK

K

- > (L)2
t.L

Ultra ProTrade
MPI > 1

ProTrade
MPI >API

MPI ~ API

Anti
Trade
MPI < API

Ultra
Anti-Trade
MPI < 0

?

+

+

+

+

-

?

?

?

+

l1X2 > 0
l1Xi ~ 0

-

-

-

?

+

> 0
2
l1Xl > 0

-

-

-

?

+

-

-

-

?

> 0

Neutral

6~ < 0

Anti-Trade
K
l1K
K
- < <(-)

L

l1L - L

2

l1X > 0
2
fl~~ 0

Neutral

,

l1K
K
_,.._

l1L

L

Pro-Trade
K

l1K

L

l1L

- > -

K

~(-)

L l

tiX

Ultra
Pro-Trade
AK

(!) .

t.L < L

1

._,:..-

-- -

'1~ < 0

l1Xl > 0

-

-
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Table 3 can provide a starting point for the dynamic analysis
of the effects of immigration on the structure of production and
trade.
It is by nov widely accepted that U.S. exports tend to be
human capit3l inten;ive while U.S. imports tend to be uns!~ill"'c! lahor
intensive.

In a

(Keesing, 1966, 1968; Waehrer 1968; Kenen 1965).

recent article, for example, Branson and Monoyios (1977) have shown
that while there is a significant positive correlation bet..een human
carital measures and net exports in the United States, the correl3tion
is significantly negative for unskilled labor and still n~gative but
only marginally significant for physical capital.
Given this trade structure and in the absence of offsetting
capital movements, the effects of immigration on the terms of trade
will depend on the skill composition ~f D.S. immigrants.

Table 4

below classifies legal immigrants into broad skill categories ._ac
cording to the occ~?ations they held at the country of origin.
Immigrants who held technical, professional and administrative jobs
are classif!ed under cater,ory l, the highest skill category.

Category

2 includes immigrants who held clerical jobs as well as those who
reported to be salesmen, craftsmen, operatives and farmers.
~

.:..,.;ludes tmskilled laborers and service workers.

columns. of Table 4 report both the actual

Category

The first three

number and the ~:rcentage

of each skill cateeory of immi~rants to the total nunber of immigrants
1n the labor force.

Column 4 reports the total nuui>er.of immigrants

each year while the last column ~ives the percentaRe of immi~rants
ia the labor force (that l• excluding depndenta). .

-; .

2S

Table 4:

Year

.

1

Immigrants Admitted by Major Category of
Occupation
Total
Number of
Skill Categories
Imigrants
2
3

Percentage
of Immigrants
in the Labor
Force

1960

27249

(.222)

61571

(.502)

33737

( .275)

265398

.461

1961

26818

( .217)

59167

(.4 78)

37703

(.305)

271344

.456

1962

29264

(.217)

58041

( .430)

47519

(.352)

283763

.475

1963

33916

(.241)

62314

( .443)

44439

(.316)

306260

.459

1964

35578

( .271)

63558

(.485)

31962

(.244)

292248

.449

1965

35880

( .274)

63288

( .484)

31643

(.242)

296697

.441

1966

36812

( .287)

S6365

( .439)

35156

(.274)

323040

.397

1967

49626

(.324)

57655

(.377)

45644

(.298)

361972

.422

1968

58189

(.278)

88636

(.424)

62206

( .297)

454448

.460

1969

45783

(.294)

64401

( .413)

45569

(.292)

358579

.434

1970

51980

(.330)

66978

(.426)

38231 . ( .243)

373326

.421

1971

55104

(.360)

56633

(.370)

41384

(.270)

370478

.413

1972

56635

( .360)

53045

(.337)

47561

(.302}

384685

.409

1973

50332

(.322)

56290

(.360)

49855

(.319)

400063

.391

1974

44689

(.295)

54428

(.360)

S2150

( .345)

394861

.383

1975

48503

(.324)

60398

(.404)

40701

( .272)

386194

.388

1976

52703

( .341)

62896

( .407)

39059

(.252)

398613

.388

1977

48411

(.322)

67118

(.447)

34725

(.2~)

358639

.419
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The aa.in eource of data for Table 4 1• Table 10A of the Annual R.eport

of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

It can be readily seen that the majority of immigrants in any
given year are dependents or people who are not in the labor force.
Thus while in 1960, categories 1-3 included 22.2, 50.2 and 27.S percent
of the total nwnber of inunierants in the labor force, imnigrants in the
labor force included only 46.1
that year.

percent of the total numler of irru::rl.grants

That percentage had dropped only slightly to 44.1 percent

in 1965 and to 41.89 percent in 1977.

It is thus reasonable to conclude

that immigration in the United States involves an increase-in the
low-skill labor pool and an increase in the population that is not
in the labor force at all.

From the analysis of Table 3 where uaw "IC" stands for human
capital and "L" for unskilled labor, it follows that an inflow of
unskilled immigrants will probably have an anti-trade or even an ultra
anti-trade bias in production as the inflow of unskilled labor expands
the production of the import-competing goods relatively to exportables.
Ceteris paribus, the terms of trade will probably improve unless there
is a shift in overall consumption preferences towards importablea.
This is rather unlikely since in many cases one of the fundamental
reasons for llligration into the United States is greater consumption
of durable goods.

Under these assumptions and unless there are off

aetting capital flows, the wlume of trade vill probably decreaae.
If the production biases are negligible due to -the amal.l uuaber of
111migrants in the labor force, then one would expect the conaumption
bia1, probably an anti-trade biaa, to dom.inate vitb conC01111tant
affect ■

on the terms of trade.

.

.

·•.

It ehould be noted that the above analysis pertains only to
the partial effects of immigration on the terms and volume of trade.

rn

times of rapid domestic growth or in times of large capital D>ve-

111e11ts these effects will tend to be relatively small.

Furthermore, if

immigration of unskilled labor coincides with capital outflows then the
anti-trade bias in production will probably be strengthened; it will
1.nstead be dampened if immigration of unskilled labor coincides with

capital inflows.

Given the fact that for the past twenty years,

there has been a steady increase in net long-term capital outflows
from the United States (Branson, 1980), it is reasonable to conclude
t:hat both factor flows in the U.S. create anti-trade biases resulting
~D

competitiveness losses as the terms of trade improve.
The analysis above rests on the assumption that the terms of

trade are not affected by changes in factor endowments in the rest
of the ~rld.

Given the importance of the United States in the

world economy this assumption does not seem unwarranted •
.

,

28
3.

Trade Policy and the Regulation of Factor Movements
~

previous two sections analyzed the interaction of trade

flows and factor 1110bility both in a static and dynamic framevork.

In

both cases trade and factor 1110bility have been shown to be"1ubstitutes"
or "complements" depending on the underlying structural characteristics
of each country as well as the similarities or differences between
trading partners.
A given degree of substitutability between trade and factor

mvements implies a given degree of substitutability in policies as
vell.

The symmetry and interdependence between commercial policy

and the regulation of factor movements is often neglected with harm
ful consequences for the effectiveness of each policy not to speak of

efficiency losses.
Section 1 of this paper analyzed the conditions under vhich
trade and factor mobility are substitutes.
case of exchange between similar .conomies.

This was generally the
Under such conditions,

any !Actor of production within a country can be protected either
through commercial policy or through barriers to additional factor
inflows.

Tariffs or other trade impediments in the United States

have been often instituted to protect unskilled labor-intensive
industries such as the textile or shoe industry and thus maintain
the real incomes of workers that would have been threatened by out
aide·competition.

Immigration quotas or other impediments to labor

inflow have often had similar objectives.

Yet it 1• imrortant to

realize that the effectiveness of either of these two aeta of
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policies depend on the responsiveness of comnodity or factor flows to
the created price differentials.

Thus, it is

possible for commercial

policy to become totally inef.fective in maintaining a high relative
real wage if the existence of a wage differential induces imnigration;
the same would hold true for tight immigration policies aimed at
protecting unskilled labor domestically if in that case, there is a
marked expansion of trade.
These conclusions need to be adjusted in the. case of "complementari ty"

between trade -and -factor 1li0bility-~ ·tn such cases-··any given restriction .
·of trade flows would result in greater protection of the scarce factor
of production than it is normally expected, since it would also reduce
factor inflows.

It follows that commercial policy and control of

international -factor movements can be used either to substitute or
to supplement each other.

As a

crude approximation one can argue that

these policies are substitutes in the case of trade or factor movements
between developed countries whereas they are complements in the case of
trade or factor movements between developed and less developed countries •
. The characteristics of the trading partners can also be
important in figuring out the likely biases in production and consumption
that would result from factor mobility.

Thus if labor mobility takes

place primarily within countries at the same stage of development and
vith similar characteristics one would expect, no radical shifts at
least in consumption patterns.

This would probably not be the case

for labor mbility between countries at different stages of development•
It

i■

thus important to note that the substitutabili ty of policies as

vell u the •ubatitutabili ty of flows depends both on the underlying

economic atructures as well u
facton.

on the characteristic.a of the footloose

Policy measures that affect the free flov of facton cid

comziodities need to be coordinated ao that policy aims are not
contradictory and policy

siea.s'P?'e.s

are effectiva.

Such coordi.n.ation

•bould be based on a clear understanding of the whole network of
interdependenci es between trade and factor mobility, element• of
vbich have been presented here.
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Appendix 1
Tables A.land A.2 below present the estimated values of the
coefficients from equation 1.

The share of emigration from country

1 to country j should be positively related to country j's real
vage and employment rate but negatively related to economic conditions

· in alternative destinations.

As can be seen from the two tables

mat of the coefficients turn out to be insignificant if not of the
wrong sign.
Table A

.

Direction of Migration as a Response to Differences
in Alternative Destination Conditions: Empirical
Estimation of Equation 1 with No Lags

Migration
from:
A

1.

A. Creece

al

a2

al

bl

b2

b3

ll2

-18.165 -21.088 f').fi51
(0.440) (0.380)

SSE

dw

0.607 1.2:

to

-13.182 -1.036
(0.442) (0.177)

0.867
(O. 362)

1.149
(0.328)

42.232
(1.S20)

I. Greece to

3.649
-11.671
(2.006)
(1.261)

-0.187
(0.251)

-0.291
(0.267)

-16.547
(2.046)

47.767
(3.730)

2.237 0.812 0.188 1.5:
(0.130)

17.757 -3.869
(2.231) (2.4 74)

0.179
(0.281)

-0.572
(0.612)

12.085
q. 737)

-26.012
(2.362)

6.939 0.896 0.236 2.41
(0.468)

A. Italy

16.409 -4.105
(1.369) (1.907)

3.257
(2.335)

-3.619
(1.627)

40.418
(2. 787)

••

Italy to
Cermany

0.553
-6.900
(2.432) (1.085)

-0.178
(0.540)

(1.2,!+)

(2 .916'

c.

Italy to
• Australia

5.618 -0.168
(0.869.( (0.,144)

0.046
(0.061)

-1.123
(0.935)

10.342

U.S.

Germany

c..

Greece to
Australia

2.

u.s.

Destination Countries:
1.

2.
3.

U.S.
Germany
Australia

0.682

-10.013

(1.321)

- 6.384 -52.029
(_0.356) (1.719)
14.661
(3.65,.)

-20.213
(2.089)

4.325

o. 707

0.272 2. 7:

0.857 0.065 1.9

(0.60'3)

3.378 0.824 0.147 1.5
(0.207)
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Table A. , pre sen ts the cor rel ati on
coe ffi cie nts bet we en aoine of
the ind epe nce nt var iab les .

The col lin ear ity bet wee n the var
iab les

par tia lly exp lain s the poo r nat
ure of the res ult s.

Table A.3:

Co rre lat ion Co eff ici ent s Betwee
n Some of the
Ind epe nde nt Va ria ble s

.

•

Ind eee nde nt Va ria ble s
N

1. ln(L)

us

-

ln( f)
C

Co rre lat ion Co eff ici ent

.66 93

2. 1nCNi:>us

drc hs
1nwv
s

-. 7402

1'
3. 1n(L)l!
S -

a
1nw Ur
US

-.S 368

_ 1 drc hs
nwG

-.7 S87

4.

s.

ln( !)

LG

-.7724
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Footnotes
1

For a good overview see Thomas (1961, 1973), Greenwood (197S)
and Cebula (1979).

2unless one country is small relative to the other or more
generally the terms of trade settle at the cost ratio of one
of the comtries.
3nie relative factor intensity of trade is harder to ascertain
in a world characterized by more factors than goods.
4

tt should be noted that the time element enters in the trade
literature as well when trade in capital goods or inventory
accumulation are considered. In such cases however there is
no clear distinction between trade in commodities and factor
movements.
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